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CONTEXTUALIZING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
Adam Lamparello*
Abstract
The level of protection afforded to an individual’s First Amendment 
right to freely exercise religion should depend upon the context within 
which it is exercised. Put differently, an individual’s right to religious 
liberty should be balanced against other individuals’ right to equal 
protection of the law, and the broader societal interest in protecting 
individuals from invidious discrimination. This Article proposes a multi-
factor test that fully protects the right to freely exercise one’s religion 
while simultaneously safeguarding equal protection and anti-
discrimination guarantees. Specifically, the level of protection afforded 
to a free exercise claim should depend, among other things, on whether it 
occurs in the private or public sphere (e.g., in a house of worship or a 
business that provides goods or services to the general public), whether 
an individual asserting such a claim is acting on behalf of a governmental 
entity, and whether the protection of religious freedom would infringe on 
equal protection and anti-discrimination principles. Such a test is 
consistent with the text and original purpose underlying the Free Exercise 
Cause and with the guarantee of equal protection and liberty for all 
citizens.
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INTRODUCTION
“[T]he character of every act depends upon the circumstances in 
which it is done.”1
                                                                                                                     
1. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (emphasis added) (citing Aikens v. 
Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904)).
2
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When Kim Davis defied the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Obergefell v. Hodges2 and refused to issue marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples, some claimed that Davis’s brief stint in a Kentucky jail after 
defying a district court’s order to issue such licenses trampled on 
religious liberty.3 After her release, Davis stood outside of a Kentucky 
courthouse with her arms raised toward the sky, brimming with the type 
of jubilation that typically occurs when some flamboyant televangelist 
miraculously “cures” a wheelchair-bound audience member simply by 
touching the person’s forehead.4 Some onlookers cheered for Davis, who 
claimed that she was acting “[u]nder God’s authority.”5
Not long before the Kim Davis fiasco, another bizarre episode 
occurred in neighboring and ultra-right-wing Indiana, which at the time 
was rightfully the laughingstock of the country after enacting a religious 
freedom law that was little more than a veiled license to discriminate 
against same-sex couples.6 Indiana’s “uncommonly silly”7 law caused 
three states to ban state-funded travel to the state of Indiana, making 
Indiana appear to some outsiders as the West’s version of ISIS.8 Months 
after that debacle, the owners of an Indiana bakery, Melissa and Aaron 
                                                                                                                     
2. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
3. See, e.g., Ryan T. Anderson, We Don’t Need Kim Davis to Be in Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/opinion/we-dont-need-kim-davis-to-be-in-jail.
html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=opinion-c-col-right-region&region= opinion-c-
col-right-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-right-region&_r=1; Greg Botelho & Dominique 
Debucquoy-Dodley, Kim Davis’ Lawyers File New Appeal over Same-Sex Marriage License 
Order, CNN (Nov. 4, 2015, 2:51 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/04/us/kim-davis-kentucky-
appeal/ (“While Davis is lampooned by critics calling her a hypocrite who doesn’t respect U.S. 
law, many supporters praise her for standing up to the courts and the powers-that-be.”).
4. Amanda Terkel, Kim Davis Released from Jail Before Defiant Crowd, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 8, 2015, 3:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/kim-davis-jail-
huckabee_us_55ef258be4b093be51bc5dcc.
5. Jack Jenkins, The Religious Beliefs of Kim Davis, The Anti-Gay Clerk Who Refuses to 
Do Her Job, Explained, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 2, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2015/
09/02/3698100/kim-davis-hypocritical-theology/.
6. See Cara Anthony, Thousands Protest ‘Religious Freedom’ Law in Indiana, USA
TODAY (Mar. 28, 2015, 11:29 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/
03/28/thousands-protest-religious-freedom-law-indy/70596032/.
7. Similarly, Justice Potter Stewart found Connecticut’s law forbidding the use of 
contraceptives by anyone to be “an uncommonly silly law.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
8. See Josh Feldman, Washington Gov. Also Bans State-Funded Travel to Indiana,
MEDIAITE (Mar. 30, 2015, 8:53 PM), http://www.mediaite.com/online/washington-gov-also-
bans-state-funded-travel-to-indiana/; Erica Orden, Cuomo Bans New York State-Funded Travel 
to Indiana, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2015, 8:48 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-yorks-
cuomo-bans-state-funded-travel-to-indiana-1427849308; Ben Rooney, Connecticut Bans State-
Funded Travel to Indiana over Anti-Gay Law, CNN: MONEY (Mar. 31, 2015, 9:54 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/30/news/indiana-religious-freedom-law/. 
3
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Klein, refused to bake a cake for a same-sex couple,9 believing that doing 
so would be a commitment to sin.10 Imagine if a business owner claimed 
that serving African-Americans, Hispanics, the disabled, or that woman 
in the wheelchair (who, it turns out, was never healed after all) was also 
a commitment to sin.11
That, in a nutshell, is the point—and the problem. 
If the courts exempted individuals’ conduct, such as Kim Davis’s and 
the Indiana bakers’, from generally applicable laws that do not 
substantially burden their religious liberty, some citizens would be 
permitted to exercise constitutional freedoms by infringing on an entire 
group’s ability to invoke basic constitutional protections. That is a 
prescription for unequal protection of the law—and unequal liberty for 
all. 
Fortunately, Kim Davis is now issuing marriage licenses, although 
Kentucky’s legislature has changed the law to ensure that Davis does not 
have to put her name on these licenses.12 The Indiana bakery is now 
closed.13 Now Melissa and Aaron Klein can have their cakes—and eat 
                                                                                                                     
9. See Aviva Shen, This Bakery Refused to Serve a Same-Sex Couple and It May Cost 
Them $135,000, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 25, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2015/04/25/
3651276/sweet-cakes-settlement-order/.
10. Another Indiana bakery received criticism for refusing to make a cake for a gay couple’s 
commitment ceremony. See, e.g., Billy Hallowell, Bakery That Ignited Controversy with Refusal 
to Bake Gay Wedding Cake Closes Up Shop: ‘We Were Just Trying to Be Right with Our God,’
BLAZE (Mar. 2, 2015, 8:21 AM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/03/02/bakery-that-
ignited-controversy-with-refusal-to-bake-gay-wedding-cake-closes-up-shop-we-were-just-trying
-to-be-right-with-our-god/ (“As attendees of a Baptist church, the McGaths . . . explained they 
didn’t want to be a part of the commitment ceremony, as they believed it reflected a ‘commitment 
to sin . . . .’”).
11. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). Justice Ginsburg stated as follows:
Would the exemption the Court holds RFRA demands for employers with 
religiously grounded objections to the use of certain contraceptives extend to 
employers with religiously grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah’s 
Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived from pigs, 
including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain 
Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among 
others)?
Id.; see David J. Stewart, Benny Hinn Is a Fake, JESUS IS SAVIOR, http://www.jesus-is-
savior.com/Wolves/benny_hinn-fake.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2016) (“Another woman in a 
wheel-chair was wheeled up to the platform, allegedly crippled from diabetes, then she walked on 
stage. . . . Again, I ask, why doesn’t Hinn ever use his alleged power to heal the sick people in 
hospitals? The reason is abundantly clear . . . Hinn is a fraud.”).
12. Associated Press, Kentucky Bows to Clerk Kim Davis and Changes Marriage License 
Rules, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015, 10:41 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-
nn-kentucky-kim-davis-20151223-story.html.
13. Sophia June, Anti-Gay Gresham Bakery Sweet Cakes by Melissa Finally Closes,
WILLAMETTE WEEK (Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.wweek.com/news/2016/10/06/anti-gay-gresham-
4
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them too. As they say, God works in mysterious ways. 
***
The above examples underscore one of the biggest controversies in 
American constitutional law today. To what extent should the right to 
freely exercise one’s religion require federal and state legislatures to 
grant citizens exemptions from laws that neither target nor discriminate 
against religion? This Article answers that question and proposes a 
solution that is rooted in the negative right to equal liberty under the law, 
that contextualizes the free exercise of religion, and that considers the 
deleterious effects of certain religious liberty claims on the constitutional 
rights of those adversely affected by their exercise. 
The text and purposes of the free exercise clause support such a 
framework.14 The Founders drafted the free exercise clause to prohibit 
the government from substantially interfering with religious liberty, such 
as through laws that coerce individuals into violating their religious 
beliefs, target specific religions or religious practices, or question the 
sincerity of an individual’s religious beliefs.15 However, the Founders did 
not envision that the government was required to grant citizens 
exemptions from generally applicable laws.16 The proposed standard in 
this Article furthers the original purposes of the free exercise clause and
safeguards citizens from unequal protection of the law.
As discussed in Part IV, four factors should guide the Court when 
evaluating whether a law substantially burdens an individual’s religious 
liberty and whether a countervailing state interest is sufficiently 
compelling.17 First, the Court must consider the role of the individual 
who seeks protection under the blanket of religious liberty. For example, 
is the individual a pastor in a private church or a clerk in the county 
courthouse? Second, the Court should consider the place in which the 
right is exercised. Is the individual seeking to exercise this right in a 
church or synagogue, or in a classroom or a courthouse? Third, the Court 
should consider the effects on third parties of exercising religion, 
                                                                                                                     
bakery-sweet-cakes-by-melissa-finally-closes/.
14. E.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 
(1993) (“Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or 
oppress a religion or its practices.”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (stating that 
“[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to 
discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the 
burden may be characterized as being only indirect” (alteration in original) (quoting Braunfeld v. 
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961))).
15. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 547; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
16. Cf. Ellis M. West, The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in Early America: The 
Cause of Conscientious Objectors to Conscription, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 367, 371 (1993–94) 
(“[T]hose who rely on the intentions of the founders to justify the argument for a right to religion-
based exemptions can find very little historical evidence to substantiate their claim.”). 
17. See infra Section IV.A. 
5
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particularly where such effects, if they had resulted from state action, 
would infringe on third parties’ constitutional rights. Fourth, the Court
should consider whether a religious liberty claim involves practices that 
are central to the individual’s belief system. It is one thing for an Amish 
family to claim that a compulsory education law infringes on the 
fundamental tenets of their religious faith.18 It is another thing for 
individuals to claim that issuing marriage licenses in their public capacity 
as county clerks infringes on their right to freely practice religion, to 
freely discriminate (which often coincides with such claims), or to 
express moral disapproval of a particular group.19
This test will appropriately balance the free exercise of religion with 
the guarantee that all citizens enjoy equal liberty, equal dignity, and equal 
protection of the law, and will further the broader purposes of the First 
Amendment.20 Part II examines the original purpose of the free speech 
clause of the First Amendment and discusses how the Court has 
contextualized the right to freely express one’s views, particularly when 
speech has a deleterious impact on third parties.21 Part II concludes by 
arguing that this approach should be adopted in the free exercise context. 
Part III examines the original purpose of the free exercise clause and 
explains how the Court has failed to create a workable test to balance an 
individual’s religious liberty with the rights of those who may suffer 
discrimination or other harms from the exercise of religious beliefs. Part 
IV introduces a new, context-based paradigm for adjudicating religious 
liberty claims under both the free exercise clause and the federal 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 199322 (and its counterparts at the 
state level) and analogizes to provisions in the Bill of Rights where the 
Court has adopted the same approach. Part IV also provides examples of 
how this test would apply to specific religious liberty claims. Ultimately, 
the Court should interpret the Constitution by recognizing the importance 
of “fair terms of social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect”23 and 
of the need to embrace equality as the foundation of individual and 
collective liberty. After all, if liberty can find no refuge in a jurisprudence 
of doubt, it can find no salvation in a jurisprudence that countenances 
unequal protection of the law.24
                                                                                                                     
18. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972).
19. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (“Moral disapproval of 
this group [homosexuals] . . . is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under 
the Equal Protection Clause.” (citing Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))).
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise 
[of religion].”). 
21. See id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”).
22. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
(2012)).
23. James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1995).
24. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
6
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I. THE CONTEXTUAL ORIGINS OF THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE
The text of the First Amendment’s free speech clause and evidence 
from early debates in Congress reveal that the Founders intended the First 
Amendment to preserve federalism by limiting the federal government’s 
ability to intrude on the states’ authority to regulate speech.25
Additionally, the Founders sought to facilitate a marketplace of ideas that 
welcomed unpopular, distasteful, or offensive speech and promoted a 
robust democratic process, but did not necessarily view the regulation—
or outright prohibition—of some types of speech as inconsistent with this 
objective.26 The interplay between these purposes demonstrates that the 
right to freely express one’s ideas was never intended to be a vehicle by 
which citizens can evade legal responsibilities. 
A. The Right to Freely Express One’s Views is Subject to Reasonable 
State Regulation
Although freedom of speech is understood “as a cornerstone of 
individual liberty,”27 it may be regulated in a variety of contexts.  Dutch 
philosopher Benedict de Spinoza believed that although freedom of 
speech was based upon the “‘indefeasible natural right’ of individuals,”
in some circumstances “government could punish speech if a man spoke 
opinions ‘which by their very nature nullify the [social] compact.’”28
Spinoza’s view, along with those of Sir William Blackstone, informed 
the Founders’ view of free speech.29 Although recognizing that “[e]very 
                                                                                                                     
25. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 
1392–93 (1997) (stating that “the main purpose of the First Amendment and much of the Bill of 
Rights . . . simply was to deny the federal government power rather than to define the rights of 
the individual”).
26. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying 
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 414 (1989))).
27. Michael A. Henderson, Today’s Symbolic Speech Dilemma: Flag Desecration and the 
Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 41 S.D. L. REV. 533, 535 (1996).
28. Michael Kahn, The Origination and Early Development of Free Speech in the United 
States: A Brief Overview, FLA. B.J., Oct. 2002, at 71, 71 (alteration in original).
29. Id. at 72. Blackstone stated as follows:
[T]he liberty of the press . . . consists in laying no previous restraints upon 
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when 
published. . . . To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licensor [is] to 
subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the 
arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion, and 
government. But to punish (as the law does at present) any dangerous or 
offensive writings, which, when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be 
adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and 
good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil 
7
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free man has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before 
the public,” Blackstone argued that some types of speech should not 
receive First Amendment protection, “including speech that was 
‘blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or 
scandalous libels.’”30
Influenced by these views, “The Founders’ conception of free 
speech . . . was vastly different from contemporary versions,” as 
they rejected the idea that “all points of view [must] have access to public 
debate.”31 Rather, the Founders embraced Blackstone’s view that some 
types of speech could be restricted.32 In fact, elected officials “from both 
major factions endorsed a quite different proposition: government, if not 
at the national then at the state level, had a positive responsibility to 
monitor—and, when necessary, to step in and moderate—political 
communication.”33
B. The Connection Between Liberty and Decentralization
The Founders did not conceive of the First Amendment “as a 
guarantee of personal freedom nor even as a protection of democratic 
processes.”34 Instead, the Founders intended the First Amendment to 
preserve federalism, particularly decentralization: 
The core First Amendment concern was centralization. 
The Founders believed that they could ensure individual 
liberty by limiting the federal government’s power, leaving 
as the domain of the states all but the categories of federal 
authority specifically enumerated in the Constitution. They 
counted on the states to maintain this allocation—to combat 
centralization—through the political process. The Framers 
of the Bill of Rights well understood that the states’ ability 
to perform this role depended crucially upon First 
Amendment protection from federal government 
censorship.35
                                                                                                                     
liberty. 
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52).
30. Id. at 71 (emphasis added) (quoting 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *151).
31. David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 1707 (1991).
32. See id.
33. NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF 
THE LAW OF LIBEL 100 (1986).
34. Yassky, supra note 31, at 1713 (finding instead that the First Amendment was “aimed 
at safeguarding the federal system”).
35. Id. (emphasis added). Senator John Lansing reaffirmed this view, stating as follows:
It has been observed, that, as the people must, of necessity, delegate essential 
powers either to the individual or general sovereignties, it is perfectly immaterial 
8
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Thus, “each state had to determine for itself how much speech to 
permit,”36 which underscores the Founders’ broader view that the 
Constitution’s structural constraints were inextricably linked to 
achieving individual and collective liberty: 
From the Founding to the Civil War, the purpose and effect 
of the First Amendment was to leave regulation of speech to 
the states. This particular concern with the power of the 
central government reflected the larger theory of 
the Founders. In the original constitutional vision, liberty 
was tied to the independence of the states. This theory was 
embedded in the constitutional structure. The separation of 
powers, the enumeration of powers in Article I, Section 8, 
and the Bill of Rights all aimed at checking the federal 
government, thereby ensuring that states would remain the 
primary loci of lawmaking authority. The First Amendment 
was a central component of the federal structure. It protected 
not only the rights of individual citizens, but also the 
prerogatives of the states, and, most important, the vitality of 
the state-based political process.37
The movement by the southern states to prohibit literature that 
advocated for the abolition of slavery also supports this interpretation.38
In response to this movement, President Andrew Jackson supported the
states’ position and proposed legislation to outlaw any discussion of 
slavery through the mails.39 However, representatives from the southern 
states believed that the “injection of the federal government into the arena 
of slavery and speech directly contravened the South’s commitment to 
principles of states’ rights.”40 Specifically, Jackson’s legislation 
authorized federal government censorship over the mails, which “would 
have rescinded one of the crucial constitutional protections of state 
independence, the First Amendment.”41 As a result, South Carolina 
Senator John Calhoun proposed alternative legislation, arguing that 
Jackson’s proposal violated ‘“one of the most sacred provisions of the 
constitution, and [was] subversive of reserved powers essential to the 
                                                                                                                     
where they are lodged; but, as the state governments will always possess a better 
representation of the feelings and interests of the people at large, it is obvious 
that those powers can be deposited with much greater safety with the state than 
the general government.
Id. at 1708 (quoting 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVETIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 217 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836)).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1716–17 (emphasis added).
38. See id. at 1716.
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preservation of the domestic institutions of the slave-holding States, and, 
with them, their peace and security.”’42 Put simply, the southern states’ 
interest in abolishing abolitionist literature was secondary to ensuring a 
decentralized governance process. 
Ultimately, the Founders likely intended that the First Amendment 
would be a limit on federal power and, consistent with the goal of 
decentralization, would enable states, including after the Supreme Court 
held in Gitlow v. New York43 that the First Amendment was incorporated 
into the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, to regulate speech in gray 
areas where the Constitution’s text and original meaning are 
indeterminate.44 For example, states would likely have the authority to 
decide if a corporation was a “person” under the First Amendment and to 
limit the amount of money that individuals and groups can contribute to 
political candidates.45 Of course, the First Amendment’s role in 
promoting decentralization must not be interpreted to undermine its
second purpose: facilitating robust public discourse on matters of social 
and political importance. 
C. A Robust Marketplace of Ideas 
The First Amendment furthers robust debate on matters of public 
import. In Snyder v. Phelps,46 the Court emphasized that “[s]peech on 
‘matters of public concern’ . . . is ‘at the heart of the First 
Amendment’s protection.’”47 Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts 
                                                                                                                     
42. Id. at 1715 (quoting 12 REGISTER OF DEBATES IN CONGRESS pt. 4, app. at 72 (1836)).
Senator Calhoun further stated as follows:
It would indeed have been but a poor triumph for the cause of liberty, in the great 
contest of 1799, had the sedition law been put down on principles that would 
have left Congress free to suppress the circulation, through the mail, of the very 
publications which that odious act was intended to prohibit. The authors of that 
memorable achievement would have had but slender claims on the gratitude of 
posterity, if their victory over the encroachment of power had been left so 
imperfect.
Id. (quoting 12 REGISTER OF DEBATES IN CONGRESS, supra, pt. 4, app. at 73).
43. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).  
44. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525–
26 (2003) (“During the ratification debates, Anti-Federalists complained that 
the Constitution’s language was ambiguous and obscure. The Constitution’s supporters 
responded that the document had been drafted with as much precision as possible, but they 
acknowledged that some indeterminacy was inevitable.” (footnotes omitted)).
45. See generally, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19, 365 (2010) 
(invalidating a federal law that, among other things, banned corporations and labor unions from 
using general treasury funds to expressly advocate for political candidates within thirty days of a 
primary election).
46. 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
47. Id. at 451–52 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 
749, 758–59 (1985)).
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explained that the right to freely express one’s views reflects “a profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”48 Justice Roberts also noted that 
“speech concerning public affairs is . . . the essence of self-
government,”49 “occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First 
Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.”50 Thus, the 
government cannot “restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, 
its subject matter, or its content.”51 Additionally, and “[i]n light of the 
substantial and expansive threats to free expression posed by content-
based restrictions,” the Court has rejected “a ‘free-floating test for First 
Amendment coverage . . . [based on] an ad hoc balancing of relative 
social costs and benefits.’”52
D. The Slow but Steady Contextualization of Free Speech 
Notwithstanding the robust protections afforded to free speech, 
“[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all 
times.”53 Provided that a law does not restrict speech on the basis of 
content, the analysis shifts to whether the speech’s value outweighs
competing societal values in its restriction. As one scholar notes, “[T]he 
Court has not hesitated to explore the limit of the right of freedom 
of speech as it interferes with competing constitutional values.”54 For 
example, states may regulate the “dangerous secondary effects” of speech 
and enact reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech,55
and afford some types of speech different levels of constitutional 
protection.56 Furthermore, several categories of speech receive no 
                                                                                                                     
48. Id. at 452 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
49. Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)).
50. Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)). In Snyder, the Court held 
that speech is considered a “matter[] of public concern when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating 
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,’ or when it ‘is a subject of 
legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the 
public.’” Id. at 453 (citation omitted) (first quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; then quoting San 
Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)); see also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 
469, 492–94 (1975) (noting the importance of public scrutiny of matters of public concern); Time, 
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967) (recognizing the importance of public matters).
51. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Am. Civil 
Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)).
52. Id. at 2544 (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 
1577, 1585 (2010)) (stating that “the Constitution ‘demands that content-based restrictions 
on speech be presumed invalid . . . and that the Government bear the burden of showing their 
constitutionality’” (quoting Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 660)).
53. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 456 (alteration in original) (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 
480 (1988)).
54. Justin Kirk Houser, Comment, Is Hate Speech Becoming the New Blasphemy? Lessons 
from an American Constitutional Dialectic, 114 PA. ST. L. REV. 571, 595 (2009).
55. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
56. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (finding 
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constitutional protection whatsoever.57
1.  Examples of Regulating Protected Speech
The United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence demonstrates that, 
although among the highest of constitutional values, free speech can be 
regulated and, in some cases, prohibited based on the harmful effects and, 
implicitly, value of such speech.
a. The Secondary Effects Doctrine
The secondary effects doctrine permits the government to suppress 
speech because of its adverse side effects, which typically requires states 
to show that otherwise-protected speech is accompanied by conduct that 
the government may legally proscribe.58 Put differently, states may 
regulate the “secondary effects” of speech provided that such regulation 
is not a veiled attempt to suppress speech on the basis of its content. As 
the Court has recognized, “municipalities must be given a ‘reasonable 
opportunity to experiment with solutions’ to address 
the secondary effects of protected speech.”59
                                                                                                                     
that “‘commercial speech’ is entitled to the protection of the First Amendment, albeit to protection 
somewhat less extensive than that afforded to ‘noncommercial speech’”). 
57. Frequently Asked Questions–Speech, FIRST AMEND. CTR., http://www.firstamendment
center.org/faq/frequently-asked-questions-speech/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2017) (including 
obscenity, defamation, child pornography, perjury, and blackmail in a list of types of speech not 
protected by the First Amendment).
58. David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: Stripping Away First 
Amendment Freedoms, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 19, 20 (2012); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (noting that some types of speech “can . . . be 
regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, 
etc.) . . . [but cannot] be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their 
distinctively proscribable content” (emphasis omitted)); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (“We have often approved [time, place, and 
manner] restrictions . . . provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest . . . .”).
59. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 439 (2002) (quoting Renton 
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986)); see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (upholding a 
law prohibiting adult theaters from operating in certain areas based on considerations such as 
crime rates, property values, and the quality of the city’s neighborhoods); Christopher J. Andrew, 
Note, The Secondary Effects Doctrine: The Historical Development, Current Application, and 
Potential Mischaracterization of an Elusive Judicial Precedent, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1175 
(2002) (“The secondary effects doctrine allows a court to characterize a speech regulation as 
content-neutral instead of content-based and apply intermediate scrutiny if the regulation is aimed 
at suppressing the ‘secondary effects’ of the speech and not the speech itself.”).
12
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b. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
In addition, states may enact reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions to further important governmental interests.60 Such 
restrictions are permitted if they “are justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech, . . . narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information.”61 Laws satisfying this
standard will be upheld “even if [they have] an incidental effect on some 
speakers or messages but not others.”62 This reflects the well-settled 
principle that “[t]he First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been 
treated as absolutes,”63 and that the right to engage in protected speech 
must be weighed against the government’s interest in regulating its 
dissemination.
c. Speech on Matters of Private Concern
Private speech does not implicate the core purposes of the First 
Amendment and therefore receives a lesser degree of constitutional 
protection.64 As the Court explained in Snyder, when laws restrict private 
speech, “‘[t]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; 
there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas’;
and the ‘threat of liability’ does not pose the risk of ‘a reaction of self-
censorship’ on matters of public import.”65
d. Commercial Speech
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York,66 the Court created a distinction between 
                                                                                                                     
60. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (“[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose 
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech . . . .”).
61. Id. (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
62. Id. (emphasis added); see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48 (discussing how a legislative 
intent to suppress free speech will invalidate a law, but if there is no such intent and there is a
substantial governmental interest, the law will be upheld); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1981) (“We have often approved restrictions of that 
kind provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that 
they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in doing so they leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication of the information.” (quoting Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 
771)).
63. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951).
64. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (“[W]here matters of purely private 
significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous. That is because 
restricting speech on purely private matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns 
as limiting speech on matters of public interest . . . .” (citations omitted)).
65. Id. (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 
(1985)).
66. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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commercial speech and other types of speech.67 Commercial speech 
consists of ‘“speech proposing a commercial transaction [and] occurs in 
an area traditionally subject to government regulation.”’68 Furthermore, 
“competing constitutional values,” including the interest in protecting the 
public from misleading advertising, warrants a lesser degree of protection 
for commercial speech.69 As a result, commercial speech that contains 
inaccurate representations to the public receives no constitutional
protection.70
2.  Banning Certain Types of Speech
Some types of speech garner no constitutional protection. In R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul,71 the Court noted that 
[O]ur society, like other free but civilized societies, has 
permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few 
limited areas, which are “of such slight social value as a step 
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.”72
For example, obscenity, fighting words, and defamatory utterances 
receive no constitutional protection.73
                                                                                                                     
67. Id. at 562. 
68. Id. (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).
69. Houser, supra note 54, at 595.
70. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 563–64 (discussing that “[t]he government 
may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it,” although 
where “the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity . . . [t]he State 
must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech” (citing 
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 447). The Court created a four-part 
test to evaluate the constitutionality of laws restricting commercial speech:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First 
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least 
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the 
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive 
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566.
71. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
72. Id. at 382–83 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (noting 
that the right to free speech “does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations”).
73. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 57. 
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a. Obscenity
In Miller v. California,74 the Court held that speech deemed legally 
obscene is entitled to no constitutional protection.75 The Miller Court 
explained that ‘“[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited 
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never 
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”’76 This includes lewd 
and obscene language, as “such utterances are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth 
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by 
the social interest in order and morality.”77 In so holding, the Court 
adopted a four-part obscenity test, which examined 
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards” would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.78
b. Fighting Words 
The Court affords no protection to “fighting words,” which are 
defined as “advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless 
action.” Typically, fighting words consist of statements “where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of 
individuals.”79 Similarly, “epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper 
sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the 
Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question 
under that instrument.”80
c. Defamatory Speech
Speech that harms an individual’s reputation likewise warrants no 
First Amendment protection.81 In fact, at common law, if a speaker’s 
                                                                                                                     
74. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
75. Id. at 23. 
76. Id. at 20 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72).
77. Id. at 20–21 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72) (noting that obscenity was 
“utterly without redeeming social importance”). 
78. Id. at 24 (citations omitted) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)).
79. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 
705 (1969)); see also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (finding that “political hyperbole” 
is not a true threat).
80. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–10 (1940).
81. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 
U.S. 250 (1952)). 
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opinions caused reputational damages, the speaker could be held liable 
for damages.82 As the Court acknowledged in Milkovich v. Lorain 
Journal Co.,83 “[t]his position was maintained even though the truth or 
falsity of an opinion—as distinguished from a statement of fact—is not a 
matter that can be objectively determined and truth is a complete defense 
to a suit for defamation.”84
E. Themes Emerging from the Court’s Free Speech Jurisprudence
The Court’s jurisprudence is consistent with the Founders’ vision that 
the First Amendment promote decentralization and robust public 
discourse.85 The Court has held in a variety of contexts that the states may 
regulate the time, place, and manner in which speech is disseminated to 
further competing social, community, and constitutional interests.86
Whether a law targets the deleterious secondary effects of speech (e.g., 
cross burning) or outlaws speech that has no value whatsoever, there can 
be no question that states play a significant role in defining the boundaries 
of permissible speech, and that countervailing societal community 
interests matter in shaping the scope of free speech rights. Indeed, 
individual liberty is “tied to the independence of the states” and depends 
“crucially upon First Amendment protection from federal government 
censorship.”87
An approach that vests states with the authority to regulate speech in 
light of the competing interest of its citizenry, including avoiding the 
harms that some types of speech cause, makes eminent sense. For 
example, if the First Amendment were construed to permit individuals to 
manufacture and disseminate obscenity, such as depictions of child 
                                                                                                                     
82. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13 (1990) (citations omitted) (stating 
that, at common law, “defamatory communications were deemed actionable regardless of whether 
they were deemed to be statements of fact or opinion”).
83. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
84. Id. at 13 (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a 
(AM. LAW INST. 1977)).
85. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011) (“[S]peech on ‘matters of 
public concern’ . . . is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985))).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 60–61. 
87. Yassky, supra note 31, at 1713, 1717. Senator John Lansing reaffirmed this view, 
stating as follows:
It has been observed, that, as the people must, of necessity, delegate essential 
powers either to the individual or general sovereignties, it is perfectly immaterial 
where they are lodged; but, as the state governments will always possess a better 
representation of the feelings and interests of the people at large, it is obvious 
that those powers can be deposited with much greater safety with the state than 
the general government. 
Id. at 1708 (quoting 2 DEBATES, supra note 35, at 217).
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pornography, it would result in material and severe harm to the victims 
of child pornography. Similarly, if individuals were permitted to incite 
violence towards individuals and groups because of their race, ethnicity, 
or gender, many citizens would be subject to severe and possibly 
irreparable injury. 
Put differently, the right to freely express one’s views should not be 
construed merely as a shield from impermissible governmental 
regulation, but as a potential sword that can deprive other citizens of basic 
constitutional protections. States have the authority to enact reasonable 
restrictions on speech that account for the speaker’s relationship to other 
citizens.88 For this reason, laws regulating speech that further important 
community interests should not be construed as governmental intrusion 
on speech per se, but as content-neutral regulations that promote the equal 
liberties and protections of all citizens. Such an effects-driven approach 
to the First Amendment, which already permeates the Court’s 
jurisprudence, underscores the principle that there are limited 
circumstances in which the exercise of an individual right can undermine 
collective liberty. Thus, provided that a law does not discriminate on the 
basis of content, the protection afforded to speech should depend in 
substantial part on a delicate balancing that considers utility, social value, 
and third-party harm. Indeed, “as has been seen in the case of obscenity, 
the desire for prohibiting speech to defend community ideals remains 
strong.”89
The Court should adopt the same approach in the free exercise context 
because not all religious practices warrant the same degree of 
constitutional protection, and because the exercise of some religious 
beliefs can infringe on the equal rights and liberties of other citizens. An 
effects-driven framework would further a vital principle that lies at the 
heart of American constitutionalism: The right of all citizens to equal 
liberty and equal protection of the law must, in some circumstances, 
trump the individual’s exercise of a fundamental constitutional right. 
II. THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The text and historical record of the free exercise clause’s adoption 
demonstrate that, although religious liberty is among the most sacrosanct 
of constitutional rights, it does not require the government to grant 
citizens exemptions from generally applicable laws that further 
legitimate, secular government purposes.90 Consequently, the Court has 
emphasized that the states may “by general and non-discriminatory 
                                                                                                                     
88. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (protecting citizens from speech 
that, among other things, appeals to the prurient interest and has no literary, scientific, or artistic 
value).
89. Houser, supra note 54, at 595.
90. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 555 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he right to free exercise was viewed as generally superior to ordinary legislation, to be 
overridden only when necessary to secure important government purposes.”).
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legislation . . . safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the 
community, without unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected 
by the Fourteenth [or First] Amendment.”91 As such, the free exercise of 
religion may experience “some slight inconvenience in order that the state 
may protect its citizens from injury.”92
A. Justice O’Connor’s Correct View in City of Boerne v. Flores—With 
One Exception
In City of Boerne v. Flores,93 the Court held that the federal Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act could not be applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.94 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy held 
that “[i]f Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s meaning, no longer would the Constitution be ‘superior 
paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.’”95
Justice O’Connor dissented and articulated an interpretation of the 
free exercise clause that is arguably consistent with its original purpose.96
O’Connor believed that the “drafters and ratifiers more likely viewed the 
Free Exercise Clause as a guarantee that government may not 
                                                                                                                     
91. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
92. Id. at 306.
93. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
94. Id. at 527, 536 (“Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power 
under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law.”).
95. Id. at 529. The Court’s decision is beyond the scope of this Article and irrelevant to the 
issues addressed here. 
96. See id. at 546–47 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In her dissenting opinion, Justice 
O’Connor noted as follows:
In Smith, five Members of this Court—without briefing or argument on the 
issue—interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to permit the government to prohibit, 
without justification, conduct mandated by an individual’s religious beliefs, so 
long as the prohibition is generally applicable. Contrary to the Court’s holding 
in that case, however, the Free Exercise Clause is not simply an 
antidiscrimination principle that protects only against those laws that single out 
religious practice for unfavorable treatment. Rather, the Clause is best 
understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious 
practices and conduct without impermissible governmental interference, even 
when such conduct conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law. 
Before Smith, our free exercise cases were generally in keeping with this idea: 
where a law substantially burdened religiously motivated conduct—regardless 
whether it was specifically targeted at religion or applied generally—we required 
government to justify that law with a compelling state interest and to use means
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 
Id. (citation omitted); see also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 570–71 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that it is “difficult to escape 
the conclusion that, whatever Smith’s virtues, they do not include a comfortable fit with 
settled law”).
18
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unnecessarily hinder believers from freely practicing their religion.”97 As 
such, the free exercise clause is “not simply an antidiscrimination 
principle that protects only against those laws that single out religious 
practice for unfavorable treatment.”98 Rather, the clause guarantees the 
“right to participate in religious practices and conduct without 
impermissible government interference, even when such conduct 
conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law.”99 Accordingly, Justice 
O’Connor argued for a rule requiring the government “to justify any 
substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state 
interest and to impose that burden only by means narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest.”100
To support these conclusions, Justice O’Connor examined the
historical development of the free exercise clause. Rhode Island’s Charter 
of 1663, for example, used the term “liberty of conscience,” and protected 
residents from being “molested, punished, disquieted, or called into
question,” for expressing their religious beliefs.101 The Charter also 
stated that residents may “freely, and fully have and enjoy his and their 
own judgments, and conscience in matters of religious concernments,” 
although residents were prohibited from “using this liberty to 
licentiousness and profaneness; nor to the civil injury, or outward 
disturbance of others.”102
Additionally, Justice O’Connor relied on evidence immediately 
preceding ratification, noting that most provisions at the state level 
“guaranteed free exercise of religion or liberty of conscience, limited by 
particular, defined state interests.”103 For example, the New York
Constitution of 1777 stated that “[t]he free exercise and enjoyment of 
                                                                                                                     
97. Flores, 521 U.S. at 549 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 546.
99. Id. at 538 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Mark David Hall, Jeffersonian Walls and 
Madisonian Lines: The Supreme Court’s Use of History in Religion Clause Cases, 85 OR. L. REV.
563, 570 (2006) (noting that Justice O’Connor, in the Flores opinion, “offered a sweeping 
examination of Founding era history to support her thesis that the ‘drafters and ratifiers more 
likely viewed the Free Exercise Clause as a guarantee that government may not unnecessarily 
hinder believers from freely practicing their religion’” (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 549
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
100. Flores, 521 U.S. at 548 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 551.
102. Id. at 551–52 (emphasis added). Justice O’Connor also relied on the first free exercise 
clause, which was drafted in 1649 and stated in relevant part that:
[N]oe person . . . professing to beleive in Jesus Christ, shall from henceforth bee 
any waies troubled, Molested or discountenanced for or in respect of his or her 
religion nor in the free exercise thereof . . . nor any way [be] compelled to the 
beleife or exercise of any other Religion against his or her consent . . . .
Id. at 551 (alterations in original) (quoting Act Concerning Religion of 1649).
103. Id. at 553.
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religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, 
shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this State, to all mankind.”104
Importantly, however, New York’s Constitution mandated that the 
“liberty of conscience . . . shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of 
licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety 
of this State.”105 Similarly, the religious liberty clause of the Georgia 
Constitution of 1777, while providing that “[a]ll persons whatever shall 
have the free exercise of their religion,” was not intended to proscribe 
laws that prohibited conduct “repugnant to the peace and safety of the 
State.”106
Noting that “[t]hese state provisions . . . are perhaps the best evidence 
of the original understanding of the Constitution’s protection of religious 
liberty,” Justice O’Connor concluded that “it is reasonable to think that 
the States that ratified the First Amendment assumed that the meaning of 
the federal free exercise provision corresponded to that of their existing 
                                                                                                                     
104. Id. (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. XXXVIII (1777)). Justice O’Connor also cited the New 
Hampshire Constitution of 1784, which stated:
Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to worship GOD according 
to the dictates of his own conscience, and reason; and no subject shall be hurt, 
molested, or restrained in his person, liberty or estate for worshipping GOD, in 
the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own 
conscience, . . . provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or disturb 
others, in their religious worship.
Id. (quoting N.H. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1784) (emphasis added)). Additionally, the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights of 1776 provided that:
[N]o person ought by any law to be molested in his person or estate on account 
of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his religious practice; unless, 
under colour of religion, any man shall disturb the good order, peace or safety 
of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others, in their 
natural, civil, or religious rights. 
Id. at 553–54 (alteration in original) (quoting MD. CONST. art. XXXIII (1776) (emphasis added)).
105. Id. at 553 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. XXXVIII (1777) (emphasis added)). Justice 
O’Connor cited the Virginia Constitutional Convention, where in 1776 the first draft of the federal 
free exercise clause was completed:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our CREATOR, and the manner of 
discharging it, can be (directed) only by reason and conviction, not by force or 
violence; and therefore, that all men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the 
exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience, unpunished and 
unrestrained by the magistrate, unless, under colour of religion, any man disturb 
the peace, the happiness, or safety of society. And that it is the mutual duty of all 
to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other.
Id. at 555 (quoting COMMITTEE DRAFT OF THE VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 18 (1776)
(emphasis added)).
106. Id. at 554 (quoting GA. CONST. art. LVI (1777) (emphasis added)).
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state clauses.”107 Furthermore, the manner in which conflicts between 
state and religious law conflicted “suggest that Americans in the Colonies 
and early States thought that, if an individual’s religious scruples 
prevented him from complying with a generally applicable law, the 
government should, if possible, excuse the person from the law’s
coverage.”108 For example, “Quakers and certain other Protestant sects 
refused on Biblical grounds to subscribe to oaths or ‘swear’ allegiance to 
civil authority.”109 Absent such “accommodation, their beliefs would 
have prevented them from participating in civic activities involving oaths, 
including testifying in court.”110 Likewise, the practice of “excusing 
religious pacifists from military service demonstrates that, long before 
the First Amendment was ratified, legislative accommodations were a 
common response to conflicts between religious practice and civil 
obligation.”111 In addition, “[b]oth North Carolina and Maryland excused 
Quakers from the requirement of removing their hats in court; Rhode 
Island exempted Jews from the requirements of the state marriage laws; 
and Georgia allowed groups of European immigrants to organize whole 
towns according to their own faith.”112
Finally, Justice O’Connor relied on the drafting history leading to the 
adoption of the federal free exercise clause, particularly James Madison’s 
draft, which included the words “freedom of conscience”: 
That religion, or the duty we owe our Creator, and the 
manner of discharging it, being under the direction of reason 
and conviction only, not of violence or compulsion, all men 
are equally entitled to the full and free exercise of it, 
according to the dictates of conscience; and therefore that no 
man or class of men ought on account of religion to be 
invested with peculiar emoluments or privileges, nor 
subjected to any penalties or disabilities, unless under color 
of religion the preservation of equal liberty, and the 
existence of the State be manifestly endangered.113
Additionally, Thomas Jefferson wrote that government could interfere 
in religious exercise when necessary to ensure peace and public safety.114
George Washington expressed similar sentiments, stating that 
                                                                                                                     
107. Id. at 553.
108. Id. at 557.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 558.
111. Id. at 559.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 555–56 (quoting Gaillard Hunt, James Madison and Religious Liberty, 1 ANN.
REP. AM. HIST. ASS’N 163, 166–67 (1901) (emphasis added)).
114. See id. at 562 (quoting 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 428–29 (Andrew A. 
Lipscomb ed., 1905)).
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[i]n my opinion the conscientious scruples of all men should
be treated with great delicacy and tenderness; and it is my 
wish and desire, that the laws may always be as extensively 
accommodated to them, as a due regard to the protection and 
essential interests of the nation may justify and permit.115
Thus, for Justice O’Connor the right to freely exercise one’s religion 
was an “essential liberty,” and government could only interfere in 
religious matters “when necessary to protect the civil peace or to prevent 
‘licentiousness.’”116 Put differently, the free exercise clause “is properly 
understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in 
religious activities without impermissible governmental interference, 
even where a believer’s conduct is in tension with a law of general 
application.”117 Justice O’Connor stated as follows:
Foremost, these early leaders accorded religious exercise a 
special constitutional status. The right to free exercise was a 
substantive guarantee of individual liberty, no less important 
than the right to free speech or the right to just compensation 
for the taking of property. . . .
. . . 
Second, all agreed that government interference in 
religious practice was not to be lightly countenanced.
Finally, all shared the conviction that “true religion and good 
morals are the only solid foundation of public liberty and 
happiness.”118
Moreover, “[g]iven the centrality of freedom of speech and religion to 
the American concept of personal liberty, it is altogether reasonable to 
conclude that both should be treated with the highest degree of 
respect.”119
Justice O’Connor’s interpretation is arguably consistent with the text 
and purpose of the free exercise clause, but with one important exception: 
the drafters did not believe that the clause required the government to 
                                                                                                                     
115. Id. (quoting Letter from George Washington to the Religious Soc’y Called Quakers
(Oct. 13, 1789)).
116. Id. at 552 (stating that “when religious beliefs conflicted with civil law, religion 
prevailed unless important state interests militated otherwise”).
117. Id. at 564. “It is reasonable to presume that the drafters and ratifiers of the First 
Amendment—many of whom served in state legislatures—assumed courts would apply the Free 
Exercise Clause similarly, so that religious liberty was safeguarded.” Id. at 560.
118. Id. at 563–64 (citation omitted) (quoting THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 219
(1983)).
119. Id. at 564–65.
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accommodate the free exercise of religion.120 To begin with, the state 
provisions upon which Justice O’Connor relied expressly permitted 
restrictions on the free exercise of religion when necessary to protect 
peace and safety. Additionally, although James Madison proposed two 
amendments that contained language protecting the “equal rights of 
conscience,”121 later revisions eliminated this language.122 The 
penultimate revision stated as follows: 
Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or 
a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of 
religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or the press, or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and petition to 
the government for the redress of grievances.123
Thus, even though the drafters did not articulate a precise definition 
of “the phrases ‘free exercise’ or ‘rights of conscience,’”124 the 
elimination of the latter phrases intimates that conscientious objections to 
civil laws were not considered a part of the free exercise of religion:
[S]ome members of the House might have thought that these 
two phrases denoted different types of protection, because 
they included both phrases in their versions of the 
amendment. If so, the record does not include their 
explanations of what the differences were. And if such 
differences did exist, the Senate may have made the point 
moot by quickly eliminating the text “rights of 
conscience.”125
As one scholar explains, the First Congress’ deliberations and the final 
version of the free exercise clause “strongly suggests that the . . . First 
Congress did not understand the Free Exercise Clause to [include a right 
to religious] exemptions from generally applicable laws.”126
In addition, the history of the Second Amendment’s drafting process, 
which occurred at the same time, underscores this view. Although early 
                                                                                                                     
120. See Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The 
Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1083, 1109 (2008).
121. Id. at 1105–07. The first of these, which was directed at the federal government, 
provided that “[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, 
nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be 
in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.” Id. at 1102–03 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834)). The second was directed at the states and stated that “[n]o State shall 
violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal 
cases.” Id. at 1103 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452).
122. Id. at 1107.
123. Id. at 1108 (quoting S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1789)).
124. Id. at 1109.
125. Id. (footnote omitted).
126. Id. at 1086.
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drafts exempted religious objectors from military service, subsequent 
drafts began to qualify the scope of such exemptions, and the ensuing 
debate among members of Congress confirms that the conscientious 
objector provision was limited in scope.127 Representative Egbert Benson 
moved to eliminate the conscientious objector provision entirely, 
believing that it was not “part of the natural right to religious liberty,” and 
that, with the exemption, the “rights of conscience could not be balanced 
against other competing governmental interests.”128 Instead, Benson 
believed that the judiciary and legislative branches would “always 
possess humanity enough to indulge this class of citizens in a matter they 
are so desirous of.”129 In a compromise amendment stating that “no 
person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms in 
person,”130 the words “in person” indicated that the state could impose 
alternative obligations on citizens who received exemptions from 
particular laws on religious grounds:
[M]any of those who opposed bearing arms were equally 
scrupulous of getting substitutes or paying an equivalent. If 
religious individuals were understood to possess a right not 
to serve in the military on account of conscientious 
objection, then for the same reason they also would seem to 
possess an equal right not to pay for an equivalent. The 
reinsertion of “in person” suggests that the House 
understood conscientious objection not to override a 
citizen’s civil obligations. Stated differently, “in person”
indicates that the House thought the state legitimately could 
demand some actions that burdened religious individuals’
consciences. By restoring the words “in person,” the House 
rejected Boudinot’s hope that they “show the world that
                                                                                                                     
127. See id. at 1102–03 (“The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; 
a well armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person 
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person.”
(quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
128. Id. at 1113–14. Some members of the House disagreed with Benson’s position, and the 
division over the conscientious objector provision resulted in a compromise amendment stating 
that “no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms in person.” Id. at 1115 
(emphasis added).
129. Id. at 1114 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 780). Benson stated as follows:
No man can claim this indulgence of right. It may be a religious persuasion, but 
it is no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the discretion of the 
Government. If this stands part of the constitution, it will be a question before 
the Judiciary on every regulation you make with respect to the organization of 
the militia, whether it comports with this declaration or not. It is extremely 
injudicious to intermix matters of doubt with fundamentals. 
Id. at 1113 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 780).
130. Id. at 1115 (emphasis added).  
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proper care is taken that the Government may not interfere 
with the religious sentiments of any person.”131
As one scholar observes, “The concurrent . . . discussions . . .
over . . . exemptions from military service . . . and . . . religious free 
exercise . . . suggest that the House did not understand religious free 
exercise to include exemptions from generally applicable laws.”132
B. The Court’s Jurisprudence in Light of the Free Exercise Clause’s 
Original Purposes and RFRA
As a general matter, the Court’s jurisprudence strongly suggests that 
the Free Exercise Clause was not meant to excuse individuals, based on 
religious belief, from complying with generally-applicable laws deemed 
constitutional. Additionally, several themes emerge from this 
jurisprudence that can guide the Court’s and lower courts’ analysis in 
future cases. 
1. The Applicable Standard
For much of its history the Court has analyzed laws allegedly 
infringing on the free exercise clause by inquiring whether it “impose[s] 
a substantial burden on the practice of religion, and . . . whether it [is] 
needed to serve a compelling government interest.”133 Under the federal 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (and its state counterparts), laws must 
not “substantially burden” the free exercise of religion.134
In Employment Division v. Smith,135 however, the Court altered this 
standard when upholding a law prohibiting “the knowing or intentional 
possession of a ‘controlled substance’ unless the substance has been 
prescribed by a medical practitioner.”136 The Respondents, members of a 
Native American Church, were fired from their jobs after ingesting 
peyote at a religious ceremony.137 They contested the law, arguing that it 
violated the free exercise clause.138 In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the 
                                                                                                                     
131. Id. at 1115–16 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 796).
132. Id. at 1118. Also stating that the drafters of the free exercise clause did not likely intend 
for it to encompass a right “to be exempt from civic obligations on account of their incompatibility 
with an individual’s religious beliefs.” Id. at 1117.
133. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014); see also
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 400–01, 410 (1963) (holding that an employee who was fired 
for refusing to work on her Sabbath could not be denied unemployment benefits); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (holding that Amish children were not required to comply with 
state law mandating that they remain in school until the age of sixteen).
134. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012)).
135. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
136. Id. at 874 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 878.  
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Court upheld the law.139 Noting that the free exercise clause “obviously 
excludes all ‘governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such’”140 the 
Court held that the right to freely exercise one’s religion did not place 
Respondents “beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically 
directed at their religious practice, and that is concededly constitutional 
as applied to those who use the drug for other reasons.”141 Justice Scalia 
emphasized that:
It is a permissible reading of the text, in the one case as in 
the other, to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion 
(or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object of the 
tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable 
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not 
been offended.142
As a result, the Court reaffirmed the rule that “the right of free exercise 
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid 
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law 
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes).’”143 In so holding, the Court reasoned that the balancing test 
used in prior cases “would open the prospect of constitutionally required 
religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable 
kind.”144
In response, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, which effectively overruled Smith and provided that the 
“[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”145
If a law substantially burdens religion, individuals are entitled to “an 
exemption from the rule unless the Government ‘demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means 
of furthering that compelling governmental interest.’”146 In essence, 
Congress re-instated the pre-Smith standard. Thus, the question now 
becomes whether Justice Scalia correctly predicted that the pre-Smith
balancing test will require exemptions for the vast majority of citizens 
who object to a law on religious grounds. Given the free exercise clause’s 
original purpose, the themes that emerged from the Court’s pre-Smith 
jurisprudence, and the competing constitutional values of other citizens, 
                                                                                                                     
139. Id. at 890.
140. Id. at 877 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)).
141. Id. at 878.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 872 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)).
144. Id. at 888. 
145. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb-1(a) (2012)).
146. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)). 
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including equal liberty and protection under the law, the answer is no.
2. The Court’s Pre- and Post-Smith Jurisprudence—Five Themes 
Emerge
In a manner that is strikingly similar to its free speech jurisprudence, 
the Court has afforded varying protections under the free exercise clause 
based on the context in which it has been exercised. Although the Court’s 
version of contextualization has not resulted in workable rules to guide 
legislatures regarding the scope of the free exercise right, several themes 
have emerged from this jurisprudence that provide a foundation upon 
which to develop a cohesive jurisprudence. 
The first theme concerns the distinction between religious beliefs and 
practices. In Reynolds v. United States,147 the Court distinguished 
between religious beliefs and practices, holding that “[l]aws are made for 
the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere 
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”148
The second theme involves laws that, by design or effect, exact too 
significant a burden on individuals’ ability to practice their religious 
beliefs or discriminate among religions. In Sherbert v. Verner,149 the 
Court invalidated a law that penalized a Seventh-day Adventist for 
violating an employer’s six-day work week policy by refusing to work on 
Saturdays in accordance with his religion.150 The Court reasoned that 
laws infringing on religious beliefs are typically upheld only where they 
are designed to prevent “some substantial threat to public safety, peace 
or order.”151 Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,152 the Court held that 
Amish children were exempt from a state’s compulsory education law, 
which required children to attend public schools until the age of 
sixteen.153 The Court emphasized that the law “affirmatively compels 
them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at 
                                                                                                                     
147. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
148. Id. at 166 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned as follows:
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious 
worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which 
he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously 
believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, 
would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her 
belief into practice?
Id.
149. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
150. Id. at 399, 410.
151. Id. at 403 (citing Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Reynolds,
98 U.S. 145).
152. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
153. Id. at 207, 235–36. 
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odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.”154 Notably, 
however, in Sherbert the Court held that generally-applicable laws, even 
if incidentally burdening the free exercise of religion, are constitutionally 
permissible.
The third theme relates to the state’s involvement in assessing the 
validity of religious beliefs. In United States v. Ballard,155 the Court held 
that juries may not make judgments regarding the sincerity of an 
individual’s religious belief.156 The Court explained that, “if those 
doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth 
or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any 
sect.”157 Similarly, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,158 the Court invalidated a 
law criminalizing solicitation for religious, charitable, or philanthropic 
purposes because solicitation permits were based on a state official’s 
determination of whether a cause was sufficiently “religious.”159
A fourth theme involves laws that coerce individuals into acting 
contrary to their religious beliefs. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n,160 the Court upheld a law that permitted road 
construction in areas that were used for religious purposes by a Native 
American tribe.161 The Court placed heavy emphasis on the fact that the 
tribe was not “coerced by the Government’s action into violating their 
religious beliefs,”162 and found that the law did not “penalize religious 
activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and 
privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”163 As the Court held, states “may 
make it more difficult to practice certain religions” so long as the laws 
“have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their 
religious beliefs.”164
The fifth theme concerns laws that impermissibly target specific 
religions or religious tenets. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah,165 the Court invalidated a law banning ritual animal 
sacrifice because the record underlying its enactment suggested that it 
was targeted at the “suppression of the central element of the Santeria 
                                                                                                                     
154. Id. at 218.
155. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
156. Id. at 87–88.  
157. Id. at 87. “The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the 
establishment of no sect.” Id. at 86 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871)). 
158. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
159. Id. at 307 (holding that “to condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of 
religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a 
determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to . . . burden . . . the exercise 
of liberty protected by the Constitution”).
160. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
161. Id. at 441–42. 
162. Id. at 449.
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 450.
165. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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worship service.”166 In so holding, the Court explained that, “if the object 
of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious 
motivation,” it is invalid absent a compelling state interest.167 Writing for 
the majority, Justice Kennedy held that “[l]egislators may not devise 
mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a 
religion or its practices.”168
The Court’s most recent jurisprudence does not fall neatly into any of 
these categories and underscores the need for a workable standard to 
guide the Court in future cases. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,169 the most 
recent post-Smith decision, the Court granted a religious accommodation 
to a closely-held corporation that refused to comply with a provision in 
the Affordable Health Care Act requiring employers to provide 
contraception coverage to female employees.170 Notably, however, the 
Court ruled on narrow grounds, holding that the contraception mandate 
was invalid only because the Department of Health and Human Services 
has alternative and less restrictive means at its disposal to achieve its 
stated objectives.171 Thus, although the Court held that the contraception 
mandate substantially burdened the corporation’s religious freedom, one 
passage in the majority opinion strongly suggests that the Court would
not, in future cases, embrace religious accommodations on the scale that 
Justice Scalia predicted in Smith:
The principal dissent raises the possibility that 
discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race, 
might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal 
sanction. Our decision today provides no such shield. The 
Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal 
opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to 
race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely 
tailored to achieve that critical goal.172
Thus, if anything, Hobby Lobby supports the proposition, as discussed 
below, that a context-based and effects-driven framework will strike the 
                                                                                                                     
166. Id. at 534, 547.
167. Id. at 533 (holding that the compelling interest must be “narrowly tailored to advance 
that interest”).
168. Id. at 547. “Although the practice of animal sacrifice may seem abhorrent to some, 
‘religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order 
to merit First Amendment protection.’” Id. at 531 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t 
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)).
169. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
170. Id. at 2786.
171. Id. at 2780 (stating that “[t]he most straightforward way of doing this would be for the 
Government to assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to any women who 
are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies due to their employers’ religious 
objections”).
172. Id. at 2783 (citation omitted).
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proper balance between religious freedom and equal liberty for all
citizens.
Ultimately, the themes that emerge from the Court’s free exercise 
jurisprudence are consistent with Justice O’Connor’s interpretation of the 
free exercise clause.173 However, as evidenced in Hobby Lobby, these 
broad proscriptions do not, by themselves, provide answers to the more 
difficult questions that are posed when individuals, such as Kim Davis 
and the Indiana bakers, refuse to issue a marriage license to gay couples 
in violation of Court precedent or turn away a same-sex couple because 
of moral disapproval of homosexuality. This is particularly true where 
the conduct for which an individual seeking protection involves 
disregarding the law and actively discriminating against third parties. In 
such circumstances, the government’s interest in requiring Davis to issue 
marriage licenses is unquestionably compelling. 
In these situations, the Court’s jurisprudence provides little, if any, 
guidance. After all, is the state substantially burdening Kim Davis’s 
ability to freely exercise her religion by requiring her to issue marriage 
licenses in her capacity as a state actor? Is the state impermissibly 
coercing the Indiana bakers to act contrary to their religious beliefs by 
prohibiting them from discriminating against individuals or groups in 
their capacity as a provider of goods and services to the public?
The answer to these questions should be no, and it should be 
influenced, at least in part, by the fact that protecting religious liberty in 
this context would result in third parties (e.g., same-sex couples) being 
denied equal protection of the law. In such cases, the Court should not, 
as it has in prior cases, interpret the free exercise clause by balancing a 
citizen’s interests in religious liberty against the government’s interest in 
regulating its exercise. Such an ad hoc balancing has resulted in a 
muddled jurisprudence that fails to properly guide lower courts, 
legislatures, and citizens concerning the scope of religious liberty, and 
neglects to consider the relationship, for purposes of protecting
constitutional rights, between citizens. 
An effects-based framework would fill the gaps in the Court’s current 
free exercise jurisprudence, recognize that all citizens should be afforded 
equal dignity and protection under the law, and further the interest in 
achieving collective, not merely individual, liberty. Free exercise claims 
(and those under RFRA) would be analyzed not merely by evaluating the 
government’s asserted interest, but by considering whether the exercise 
of religion in particular contexts results in constitutional harms to other 
citizens. As discussed below, in conducting this analysis, four factors 
should guide the Court’s analysis: (1) the role within which the individual 
seeks to exercise religious beliefs; (2) the place where the exercise of such 
beliefs will occur; (3) the effects on third parties; and (4) whether the 
religious practice for which an individual seeks protection is central to 
their belief system (not whether the belief is objectively valid).174
                                                                                                                     
173. See supra Section III.A. 
174. See infra Section IV.A. 
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III. CONTEXTUALIZING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION IN A MANNER 
CONSISTENT WITH ITS ORIGINAL PURPOSES AND THE COURT’S
JURISPRUDENCE
For too long, the Court has analyzed religious liberty claims by virtue 
of the relationship between the religious believer and the government and 
not by considering the effects of religious practices on third parties. 
Without that inquiry, an individual’s free exercise of religion may 
become a sword that is used to undermine liberty and equality for those 
affected by its exercise (e.g., same-sex couples), rather than a shield 
against “impermissible governmental interference.”175 Simply put, 
protecting religious freedom for the few should not be permitted if it 
compromises liberty and equality for an entire group. The importance of 
linking equality to liberty in this context cannot be overstated:
A denial of liberty often contains within it the seeds of a 
denial of equality. The government denies a marginalized or 
disfavored group the full exercise of liberty to express a 
judgment of that group’s inferiority and to prescribe the 
proper roles and expected behavior of members of that
group. Likewise, a denial of equality often contains within it 
the seeds of a denial of liberty. Discriminatory laws often 
force the members of a marginalized or disfavored group to 
forfeit their liberty to conform to majority assumptions 
about their proper roles and expected conduct.176
A contextual framework that focuses not simply on the asserted 
governmental interest in restricting religious liberty, but on the effects 
that the exercise of religion has on other citizens would bring balance and 
cohesion to free exercise jurisprudence. 
In conducting this inquiry, four factors should drive the Court’s 
analysis. First, regarding the individual who asserts a religious liberty 
claim, courts should consider the individual’s role. Second, the Court 
should consider the place within which the religious liberty claim is 
asserted. Third, and as discussed above, the Court should consider the 
effects of a religious liberty claim on third parties. Fourth, the Court 
should examine whether the practice is, as in Yoder, integral to the 
individual’s religious beliefs.177 Of course, the government’s interests 
will always be relevant, but the effect of exercising religious practices on 
                                                                                                                     
175. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 546 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Clause is best understood as protecting from “impermissible governmental 
interference, even when such conduct conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law”).
176. David H. Gans, The Unitary Fourteenth Amendment, 56 EMORY L.J. 907, 926–27 
(2007). 
177. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) (finding that “the Amish in [that] case 
[had] convincingly demonstrated . . . the vital role that belief and daily conduct play in the 
continued survival of Old Order Amish communities and their religious organization”). 
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third parties is the best evidence of whether those interests are 
constitutionally permissible.178
A. The Four-Factor Test 
In evaluating religious liberty claims under either the free exercise 
clause or RFRA, the Court should consider: (1) the individual’s role; (2) 
the place in which the religious liberty claim is asserted; (3) the effect the 
conduct has on third parties; and (4) the centrality of the practice to that
individual’s religious belief system.
1. The Individual’s Role
The courts should consider the specific role within which an 
individual seeks to exercise religious practices because it will impact the 
strength of a religious liberty claim. For example, is the individual a 
pastor in the Catholic Church and seeking an exemption from laws 
requiring performance of same-sex marriage ceremonies, or a county 
clerk who is charged with issuing marriage licenses in accordance with 
the law? Is the individual seeking to exercise his or her religion in a 
private church or in a public business that provides services to the public?
The difference is significant because it has a direct impact on the 
targeting and coercion aspects of the Court’s free exercise determination.
If a law prohibits all businesses from discriminating on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, and sexual orientation, it is highly unlikely that the law is 
directly or indirectly targeting specific religions or religious practices. 
Rather, the purpose of such law—to protect citizens from unequal 
treatment—is not related to religious beliefs or practices, similar to the
way that time, place, and manner restrictions on speech are not related to 
the content of speech. In such circumstances, it would be difficult to argue 
that the government is discriminating against particular religious beliefs, 
or that the interests it seeks to further are not compelling. The Court in 
United States v. Lee,179 held that “[w]hen followers of a particular sect 
enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept 
on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be 
superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in 
that activity.”180
On the other hand, if the claimant is a pastor in a Catholic Church, the 
analysis changes and the arguments for impermissible targeting are more 
persuasive. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the law at issue, 
although facially neutral, prohibited conduct that was considered a sacred 
                                                                                                                     
178. This is not to say that the law should never try to accommodate religious groups. To the 
contrary, government should make every attempt to do so, but when the accommodation at issue 
results in discrimination, unequal treatment, or other legal harms to third parties, the government’s 
interest in regulating such conduct outweighs the strength of a religious liberty claim.
179. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
180. Id. at 261.
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ritual in the Santeria religion.181 Coupled with the fact that the record 
underlying the law’s passage contained text that made it clear that the 
Santeria religion was being targeted, the Court correctly determined that 
it violated the free exercise clause.182 Put differently, the use of a facially 
neutral law to target the Santeria religion offended one of the original 
purposes of the free exercise clause, which was to prohibit government 
from invidiously discriminating against particular religions or religious 
practices.183
The individual’s role also implicates the concept of coercion.
Although a credible argument can be made that an anti-discrimination 
law coerces individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, the 
alleged coercion is, at best, indirect. Moreover, the coercive aspect of 
such a law applies to the individual in his or her public role as an 
employee of the government,and has no effect on the individual’s right 
to privately exercise her religious beliefs. Under this logic, the state may 
compel Kim Davis to issue marriage licenses, but it could not compel 
Davis to marry a same-sex couple in her place of worship. Perhaps most 
importantly, an anti-discrimination law is an equality-enhancing function 
that protects citizens from discriminatory conduct while simultaneously 
not denying people of religious faith the equal protection of the law. As
the Court stated in Lyng, such a law does not “penalize religious activity 
by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and 
privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”184 Thus, although the coercion in 
this context is indirect, the effects on other citizens (e.g., same-sex 
couples) is direct in every sense.
This approach is not foreign to the Court’s broader First Amendment 
jurisprudence. For example, when a plaintiff seeks damages for allegedly 
false and defamatory statements, the burden of proof depends on the 
status of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is a public figure, he must 
demonstrate the speaker made the statement with actual malice.185
Conversely, if the plaintiff is a private figure, the standard is lowered and 
he must demonstrate that the statement was negligently made.186 The 
purpose of heightening the burden of proof for public-figure plaintiffs 
was to ensure that individuals could criticize public officials without 
fearing that they could be hauled into court and held liable for 
damages.187 In other words, the different burdens of proof are directly 
                                                                                                                     
181. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 538
(1993).
182. See id. at 534–35. 
183. See id. at 542.  
184. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988).
185. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 159 (1979) (stating “public officials and 
public figures who sue for defamation must prove knowing or reckless falsehood in order to 
establish liability”). 
186. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343, 347 (1974).
187. Id. at 348. 
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related to the original purpose of the First Amendment: to facilitate a 
robust marketplace of ideas.
2. The Place 
The place where a religious liberty claim is asserted implicates the 
same considerations as the individual’s role. If a state passed a law 
outlawing the ritualistic sacrifice of animals, one could not credibly argue 
that the law would offend the free exercise clause in every context. In 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, for example, the ban on animal sacrifices applied 
disproportionately to the Santeria religion and prohibited its members 
from practicing their religion in a private place of worship.188 In this way, 
the law both targeted the Santeria religion and substantially interfered 
with its members’ ability to freely exercise their religious beliefs. 
On the other hand, if the law in question prohibited the ritualistic 
sacrifice of animals on a public street between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 
5:00 p.m., the argument for targeting would be meritless. In this situation, 
the law regulates the context within which ritualistic animal sacrifice may 
occur to further secular interests—public order and peace—that are 
unrelated to the religious character of this practice. For this reason, the 
law would not violate the free exercise clause, just as the prohibition on 
cross-burning in Virginia v. Black189 did not violate the free exercise 
clause because it furthered secular interests—prohibiting harassment and 
intimidation—that were unrelated to the content of the speech.190
Again, this approach is not foreign to the Court’s jurisprudence. As 
Justice Ginsburg recognized in Hobby Lobby, “For many individuals, 
religious activity derives meaning in large measure from participation in 
a larger religious community,” and “furtherance of the autonomy of 
religious organizations often furthers individual religious freedom as 
well.”191 Conversely, “[n]o such solicitude is traditional for commercial 
organizations,” and “religious exemptions had never been extended to 
any entity operating in ‘the commercial, profit-making world.’”192 The 
reason for such a distinction is that “for-profit corporations . . . use labor 
to make a profit, rather than to perpetuate [the] religious value[s] [shared 
by a community of believers].”193 As such, the free exercise clause 
“shelter[s] churches and other nonprofit religion-based organizations,” 
not corporations or other public entities.194
                                                                                                                     
188. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 535.
189. 538 U.S. 342 (2003). 
190. See id. at 344. 
191. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
192. Id. at 2795 (quoting Amos, 483 U.S. at 337).
193. Id. at 2796–97 (alterations in original) (quoting Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
194. Id. at 2794. Justice Ginsburg further stated:
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By way of analogy, in the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has 
afforded citizens varying degrees of privacy protections—and shifted law 
enforcement’s evidentiary burden—based on the place in which an 
alleged Fourth Amendment violation occurs. Privacy rights receive the 
highest level of protection in the home, where law enforcement is
required to have probable cause and a warrant before conducting a 
search.195 When citizens travel in automobiles, however, their privacy 
protections are diminished, and law enforcement need only possess 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to detain a motorist.196 Finally, 
when citizens walk on a public street or place objects in an open field, 
they have no expectation of privacy and law enforcement may observe 
them without justification.197 As with outlawing animal sacrifice on a 
public street, the relationship between the strength of citizens’ privacy 
rights and their location is based on the governmental and societal interest 
in protecting public safety.
3. The Effects on Third Parties
In the free speech context, when considering the validity of 
regulations that impact free speech rights, the Court has upheld 
legislation restricting speech because of its deleterious secondary effects. 
The Court should adopt the same approach in free exercise cases because, 
in limited circumstances, community values outweigh individual values. 
In Hobby Lobby, the Court acknowledged that it “must take adequate 
account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on 
nonbeneficiaries.”198 The “effects” prong fundamentally alters the 
relational aspect of the free exercise and RFRA inquiries. Rather than 
simply focusing on the relationship between the individual and 
government, this prong requires the Court to consider the relationship 
between citizens and to evaluate whether the exercise of an individual’s 
religious liberty denies other individuals “an equal share of the rights, 
benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”199 In conducting this 
                                                                                                                     
Religious organizations exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to the 
same religious faith. Not so of for-profit corporations. Workers who sustain the 
operations of those corporations commonly are not drawn from one religious 
community. Indeed, by law, no religion-based criterion can restrict the work 
force of for-profit corporations. The distinction between a community made up 
of believers in the same religion and one embracing persons of diverse beliefs, 
clear as it is, constantly escapes the Court’s attention. One can only wonder why 
the Court shuts this key difference from sight.
Id. at 2795–96 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
195. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
196. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014).
197. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
198. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (emphasis added) (quoting Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005)).
199. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988).
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inquiry, the Court should focus on whether the conduct for which a 
citizen seeks constitutional protection (e.g., the right to refuse to issue 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples), if engaged in by the government,
would have the effect of violating other citizens’ legal and constitutional 
rights. 
Perhaps most importantly, an effects-driven inquiry would ensure that 
the free exercise of religion does not subject other citizens to 
discrimination on the basis of, among other things, race and ethnicity. In 
Hobby Lobby, Justice Ginsburg stated:
Would the exemption the Court holds RFRA demands for 
employers with religiously grounded objections to the use of 
certain contraceptives extend to employers with religiously 
grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah’s
Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications 
derived from pigs, including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, 
and pills coated with gelatin (certain Muslims, Jews, and 
Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among 
others)? According to counsel for Hobby Lobby, “each one 
of these cases . . . would have to be evaluated on its 
own . . . apply[ing] the compelling interest-least restrictive 
alternative test.” Not much help there for the lower courts 
bound by today’s decision.200
Thus, defining the scope of religious liberty in part based on its third-
party effects would avoid these problems, promote equality under the 
law, and further a collective view of liberty. Justice Ginsburg endorsed 
this approach in Hobby Lobby, stating that “[n]o tradition, and no prior 
decision under RFRA, allows a religion-based exemption when the 
accommodation would be harmful to others.”201 It would also enable the 
Court to identify circumstances in which citizens are merely expressing 
moral disapproval of a particular group rather than exercising a religious 
belief.202 If the government cannot enact laws driven by moral 
disapproval of a group of citizens, as the Court held in Lawrence, then in 
some situations, citizens should not be permitted to base religious 
freedom claims on that same disapproval. As the Court held in Prince v. 
Massachusetts,203 the “limitations [that] bound religious 
freedom . . . begin to operate whenever activities begin to affect or collide 
with liberties of others or of the public.”204
                                                                                                                     
200. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citation 
omitted) (Justice Ginsburg also noted that “approving some religious claims while deeming others 
unworthy of accommodation could be ‘perceived as favoring one religion over another,’ the very 
‘risk the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude.’” (quoting United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1996))).
201. Id. at 2801.
202. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
203. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
204. Id. at 177.
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Of course, religious liberty proponents would likely argue that they 
are not infringing on the rights of any citizen but merely seeking a 
religious accommodation for their deeply held beliefs. Even if the free 
exercise clause’s original purposes supported this argument, the Court 
should not embrace it as a normative matter. If the Court protected 
religious freedom regardless of the fact that an individual was acting in a 
public role, in a capacity as a public official, and in a manner that would 
cause constitutional harm to third parties, religious accommodations 
would become a prescription for inequality of a very undemocratic kind. 
In other contexts, the analysis would likely differ. As discussed above, 
in Hobby Lobby, the Court accommodated the religious beliefs of a 
closely held corporation primarily because the government had less
intrusive means by which to achieve its objective (contraception coverage 
for female employees).205 However, even if the Court had ruled that the 
government must make an exception for closely held corporations in all 
cases, it would be consistent with an effect-based approach to free 
exercise claims. Specifically, unlike Davis, who would have deprived 
same-sex couples of their fundamental right to marriage, the closely held 
corporation will not deprive female employees of a constitutional right or 
protection. Although it will likely be an inconvenience to some
employees to purchase contraception from a store or through a physician, 
those individuals are not the victims of unlawful discrimination nor are 
they being denied equal protection of the law. Simply put, the effects 
prong is not intended to prohibit the free exercise of religion in all cases 
and contexts but merely to strike a better balance in favor of citizens’ 
collective constitutional rights. 
4. Whether the Practice Is a Central Component of an Individual’s 
Religious Beliefs
The final prong of this test involves a careful inquiry into whether a 
religious liberty claim involves practices that are central to the 
individual’s religious beliefs. To be clear, this does not—and cannot—
permit the Court to assess the validity of a particular religion or, in 
violation of Ballard, the sincerity of an individual’s beliefs. Such a 
subjective inquiry would place the Court in a position to implicitly value 
certain religious beliefs over others, in violation of the Establishment 
Clause.206 Instead, under this prong the Court would evaluate the 
objective reasonableness of an individual’s free exercise claim by 
examining the centrality of particular conduct to a religious belief. 
Including an objective reasonableness inquiry in the free exercise 
context is consistent with the Court’s precedent. For example, the Court 
has stated that “[t]he free exercise inquiry asks whether government has 
                                                                                                                     
205. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780–81.
206. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . .”).
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placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central 
religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental 
interest justifies the burden.”207 By way of analogy, in the Fourth 
Amendment context, the Court protects an individual’s privacy rights 
only if they are objectively reasonable.208 In fact, in Yoder, the Court 
emphasized the objective reasonableness of the Amish parents’ free 
exercise claim:
[T]he impact of the compulsory-attendance law [is not] 
confined to grave interference with important Amish 
religious tenets from a subjective point of view. It carries 
with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free 
exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed 
to prevent. As the record shows, compulsory school 
attendance to age 16 for Amish children carries with it a very 
real threat of undermining the Amish community and 
religious practice as they exist today; they must either 
abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be 
forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant region.209
This approach makes eminent sense. After all, it is one thing to allow 
Amish families to educate their children in accordance with their basic 
religious values, but it is quite another to allow individuals to refuse to 
issue marriage licenses or bake wedding cakes in violation of the law, and 
at the expense of other citizens’ constitutional protections. Unlike in 
Yoder, where the Amish asserted a religious liberty claim that was “not 
simply a matter of theocratic belief,” but rather one that “pervades 
and determines virtually their entire way of life,”210 refusing to issue 
                                                                                                                     
207. Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (emphasis added).
208. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (“The Amendment does not protect 
the merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only those ‘expectation[s] that society is
prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”’” (alteration in original) (quoting Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967))).
209. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (emphasis added).
210. Id. at 216. The Court stated as follows:
[T]he record in this case abundantly supports the claim that the traditional way 
of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep 
religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to 
daily living. That the Old Order Amish daily life and religious practice stem from 
their faith is shown by the fact that it is in response to their literal interpretation 
of the Biblical injunction from the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, ‘be not 
conformed to this world . . . .’ This command is fundamental to the Amish faith. 
Moreover, for the Old Order Amish, religion is not simply a matter of theocratic 
belief. As the expert witnesses explained, the Old Order Amish religion pervades 
and determines virtually their entire way of life, regulating it with the detail of 
the Talmudic diet through the strictly enforced rules of the church community.
Id.
38
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss3/1
2017] CONTEXTUALIZING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 719
marriage licenses or bake a cake for a same-sex couple has no direct
impact on an individual’s ability to freely practice his religious beliefs.
Furthermore, the Amish family’s claim in Yoder did not result in unlawful 
discrimination against other citizens or unequal treatment under the 
law.211 In short, the Amish family’s right to freely exercise their religion 
was objectively reasonable. And reasonableness, not a categorical 
accommodation for religious liberty claims, would produce “a coherent 
scheme of equal basic liberties, or fair terms of social cooperation on the 
basis of mutual respect and trust, for our constitutional democracy.”212
After all, it is “the entitlement of each constituent to have his or her 
interest taken into account, on equal footing with those of all others.”213
B. Ensuring Consistency with the Original Purpose of the Free
Exercise Clause and the Court’s Jurisprudence
A context-centered framework is consistent with the original purposes 
of the free exercise clause and the Court’s jurisprudence and harmonizes 
the right to freely practice one’s religion with citizens’ competing right 
to equal protection of the law.
1. The Original Purpose of the Free Exercise Clause
The historical record, particularly at the time the free exercise clause 
was drafted, demonstrates that the drafters intended to prohibit the 
government from “unnecessarily hinder[ing] believers from freely 
practicing their religion.”214 In other words, the clause proscribes 
“impermissible governmental interference, even when such conduct 
conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law.”215 Thus, Justice 
O’Connor was correct, and Smith was wrongly decided. 
However, this does not end the constitutional inquiry. Before the free 
exercise clause was drafted, Thomas Jefferson wrote that the government 
could restrict religious liberty to preserve “peace and good order.”216 In 
addition, the Court has repeatedly acknowledged that the states may 
lawfully regulate religious practices to “safeguard the peace, good order 
and comfort of the community, without unconstitutionally invading the 
liberties protected by the Fourteenth [or First] Amendment.”217 Tellingly, 
the Court has employed nearly identical language in its free speech cases, 
                                                                                                                     
211. See id. at 224. 
212. James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 211, 290 
(1993).
213. Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1558 (2002).
214. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 549 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 546.
216. Id. at 562.
217. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
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holding that an individual’s free speech right may be restricted when it is 
“outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”218
This language suggests that neither the drafters nor the Court view the 
free exercise clause as requiring the states to categorically accommodate 
religious liberty claims and therefore exempt citizens from generally 
applicable laws. The Court’s narrowly crafted decision in Hobby Lobby,
particularly the passage intimating that religious liberty claims could 
never be used to sanction racial (and likely other) forms of discrimination,
supports this conclusion.219 By considering factors such as an 
individual’s role, the place of religious exercise, the effect on third 
parties, and the centrality of a religious claim to the core religious beliefs, 
the Court would ensure the “peace, good order and comfort of the 
community”220 by protecting all citizens from invidious discrimination 
and unequal protection of the laws. In doing so, the Court would also 
safeguard the free exercise of religion from arbitrary laws that seek to 
accomplish precisely what the free exercise clause forbids: targeting 
specific religious beliefs and practices, discriminating against particular 
religions, and coercing individuals to act contrary to core religious 
beliefs. Put simply, this test would promote social order through equal 
liberty while simultaneously prohibiting impermissible governmental 
interference through laws that, by design or effect, substantially burden 
the free exercise of religion.
2. The Court’s Jurisprudence
The proposed standard in this framework is consistent with the 
Court’s pre- and post-Smith jurisprudence, and would provide adequate 
guidance to lower courts and lawmakers in future cases. In Sherbert, the 
law at issue penalized an employee for adhering to a religiously mandated 
day of rest, even though it had no effect on third parties and was central 
to the employee’s religious beliefs.221 In Yoder, the state compelled
Amish children to attend public schools in violation of their religious 
beliefs, even though these beliefs were exercised in a private role and 
place, had no effect on third parties, and were central to the Amish belief 
system.222 Similarly, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the law 
prohibiting animal slaughter, albeit well-intentioned, directly targeted the 
Santeria faith and impermissibly interfered with a religious practice in a 
private place of worship.223 The proposed standard in this Article would 
lead to the same results—with one exception. If this standard were 
applied to the facts in Smith, the result would have been different. The 
                                                                                                                     
218. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
219. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014).
220. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added).
221. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409–10 (1963).
222. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972).
223. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 546–47
(1993).
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law in Smith, although generally applicable, enabled precisely the type of 
governmental interference with religion that the Court invalidated in 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye: interference with ceremonial religious 
practices at private places of worship. 
Furthermore, this standard not only fits well with the Court’s prior 
jurisprudence, it also gives the Court a path by which to specifically 
define what it means to “substantially burden[] a person’s exercise of 
religion”224 under RFRA and thus facilitates the development of 
workable rules to apply in future cases. Currently, it is difficult to identify 
with precision laws that would substantially burden religion, which 
invariably necessitates the ad hoc, case-by-case approach that is 
characteristic of the Court’s pre- and post-Smith jurisprudence. By 
defining this phrase with clarity and specificity, the Court can import 
predictability, fairness, and balance into the free exercise—and public—
arena.
CONCLUSION
The Court should evaluate religious liberty claims with the 
understanding that “it is only in an egalitarian society that full and 
extensive liberty is possible.”225 At bottom, the free exercise of religion
is an expression of liberty itself, and it would be quite ironic if the 
protections for religious liberty resulted in a constitutional hierarchy of 
values that undermined the very egalitarianism upon which liberty is 
predicated. Evaluating religious liberty claims through the proposed 
framework in this Article yields no less protection for religious freedom 
than the Founders envisaged but no more protection than is needed to 
ensure that religious liberty is exercised in a manner consistent with equal 
protection of the law. Although this does not mean that “freedom or 
equality must be somehow traded off against itself,”226 it does require an 
appreciation that a “constitutional democracy cannot allow for a graded 
hierarchy of the basic dignity of persons.”227 And dignity, not 
discrimination, is the foundation of a liberty-based constitutional 
democracy. After all, if citizens dare to claim that they are acting under 
“God’s authority,” those who will most likely benefit from God’s good 
graces should embrace dignity over discrimination and equality over 
ecclesiasticism.
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